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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Sup. Ct. Case No. 20040894-SC

v.
ROBERT ELLIS COX,
Defendant/Petitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a grant of a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The order granting certiorari review framed the sole issue as follows:
Whether an appellate court has authority to remand for nunc-pro-tunc resentencing
after it has determined it lacks jurisdiction over a direct appeal from a criminal conviction?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews "the court of appeals' decision for
correctness and grant[s] no deference to its conclusions of law." State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35,
18, _ P.3d _ (citing State v. James, 2000 UT 80, ^ 8,13 P.3d 576). "Jurisdictional issues
are likewise reviewed for correctness." State v. Finlayson, 2004 UT 10, \ 5, 84 P.3d 1193.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following constitutional, statutory, and rule provisions are reproduced
in Addendum B:
Utah Const., art. VIII, §§ 3, 4;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (West 2004) (Supreme Court jurisdiction);
Utah Code Ann. § 78~2a-3 (West 2004) (Court of Appeals jurisdiction);
Utah R. App. P. 2;
Utah R. App. P. 4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Defendant was charged with four counts of sodomy on a child, four counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, and one count of rape of a child, all first degree felonies.
Rl 18-21. On 15 October 2003, a jury found defendant guilty on all counts. R161-76.
On 5 December 2003, defendant filed a motion for new trial. R182. Defendant was
sentenced three days later, on 8 December 2003. R203-06. On 11 March 2004, the trial
court denied defendant's motion for new trial. R263-65. On 8 April 2004, defendant filed
his notice of appeal. R266.
On 30 April 2004, the State moved this Court to dismiss defendant's appeal for lack
of jurisdiction because defendant's notice of appeal was untimely. The State's motion
explained that defendant's new trial motion was filed prematurely— before sentencing— and
was therefore untimely. See State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, ^ 7-8. This meant that
defendant's new trial motion did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. See id at 3-8;
!

The underlying facts are irrelevant to the question on review. Thus, this brief will
only present the procedural history of the case.
2

see also Utah R. App. P. 4(b). Thus, to be timely, defendant's notice of appeal had to be
filed no later than 7 January 2004, thirty days after sentencing. See Utah R. App. P. 4;
Putnik, 2002 UT 122,110. Because defendant did not file his notice of appeal until three
months later, on 8 April 2004, it was untimely and this Court lacked jurisdiction over the
appeal.
Without ruling on the State's motion to dismiss, this Court transferred the case to the
court of appeals. The court of appeals issued a sua sponte motion for summary disposition,
also on the ground that the notice of appeal was untimely because defendant's new trial
motion was premature and did not toll the time for appeal.
Instead of responding to the two motions, defendant filed a "Motion to Temporarily
Remand for Resentencing." State v. Cox, 2004 UT App 277, at page 2. (A copy of the court
of appeals' unpublished decision is attached at Addendum A). Defendant's motion conceded
that his notice of appeal was untimely, but argued that the appeal should not be dismissed.
Instead, defendant argued, the appeal should be temporarily remanded to the trial court for
nunc pro tunc resentencing. Id. See also Defendant's Supporting Memorandum, attached
as Addendum C. The court of appeals denied defendant's motion because when "a notice
of appeal is untimely filed, [an appellate court] lacks jurisdiction to do anything other than
dismiss the action." Id. at page 1 (citing Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569,
570 (Utah App. 1989)). The court of appeals informed defendant, however, that he could
seek nunc pro tunc resentencing through a post-conviction petition in the district court. Id.

3

at pages 2-3 (citing State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981) and Manning v. State,
2004 UT App 87, \ 20, 89 P.3d 196, cert granted by 98 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004).
This Court granted defendant's timely petition for a writ of certiorari.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is well-settled in this state that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely
appeal. It is equally well-settled that when an appellate court lacks jurisdiction, it must
dismiss the appeal. Indeed, courts universally recognize that a court without jurisdiction
lacks the authority to do anything but dismiss the appeal.
Defendant concedes both that his notice of appeal was untimely and that the court of
appeals lacked jurisdiction over his appeal. He nevertheless claims that the court of appeals
erred in dismissing his appeal. Defendant argues that the court of appeals should have
instead remanded his untimely appeal to the district court with an order that he be
resentenced so as to restart the time for appeal.
But, as stated, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to do anything but dismiss the
untimely appeal. Neither this Court's inherent supervisory authority nor its writ authority
authorizes an appellate court to suspend, circumvent, or enlarge the time limits for appealing
in rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the court of appeals properly dismissed the
appeal and left defendant to pursue emy right to resentencing in the district court.

4

ARGUMENT
BECAUSE AN APPELLATE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO DO
ANYTHING BUT DISMISS AN UNTIMELY APPEAL, IT DOES NOT
HAVE AUTHORITY TO REMAND FOR NUNC-PRO-TUNC
RESENTENCING
Jurisdiction is "[a] court's power to decide a case or issue a decree.55 Black's Law
Dictionary 867 (8th ed. 2004). See also Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 38, 100 P.3d 1177
(subject matter jurisdiction is "the authority of the court to decide the case55). In Utah, it is
well-settled that an appellate court does not have the power or jurisdiction to decide an
untimely appeal. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, f 5, 57 P.3d 1065. The question before
this Court is whether an appellate court in general, and the court of appeals in particular, has
jurisdiction in an untimely appeal to remand to the district court with directions to resentence
the defendant, so as to restart the time for appeal.
As explained below, the answer is unequivocally "no.55 An appellate court that lacks
jurisdiction to decide an untimely appeal necessarily lacks jurisdiction to order any kind of
relief for the appellant. Rather, the appellate court has power only to dismiss the untimely
appeal. Contrary to defendant's argument, neither this Court's inherent supervisory power
nor its writ authority permits either it, or the court of appeals, to enlarge its appellate
jurisdiction. This is true even when it appears obvious that the appellant may be entitled to
relief in some other forum, such as resentencing in the district court.

5

A.

When a matter is outside a court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to
dismiss the action.
1.

An appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely appeal.

Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that a notice of appeal be filed
"within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. 4(a). A
timely motion for new trial under mle 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, tolls the time
for appeal. Utah R. App. 4(b). If a timely rule 24 motion is filed, the time for appeal runs
from the entry of the order denying a new trial, rather than from thefinaljudgment. See State
v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, ^ 4, 63 P.3d 91. An untimely motion for new trial, however, does
not toll the time for appeal. Id. at 10. If, as here, an untimely motion for new trial is filed,
the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the final judgment, which in
criminal cases, is the sentence. See id; Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ^ 4. Defendant concedes, as
he did in the court of appeals, that his notice of appeal was untimely. Br. Pet. 3,5.
"Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction over the
appeal." See Reisbeckv. HCA Health Services of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, \ 5, 2 P.3d 447.
See also State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118,123, 62 P.3d 444; Bowers, 2002 UT 100, t 5;
Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, \ 20-21, 44 P.3d 663; State v. Johnson, 635
P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 1981); State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927, 928-29 (Utah 1979). This is true
in both civil and criminal appeals. See id.; State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37.
An appellate court does not have the authority to enlarge the time for appeal.
Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37. See also Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ^f 5 ("This court has no authority

6

to extend its jurisdiction beyond the 30-day period for filing notice of appeal plainly stated
in [rule 4]"). "Nor does this court have power to transubstantiate an untimely notice of
appeal into a timely one." Bowers, 2002 UT 100, \ 5. And while an appellate court may
suspend many of the rules of appellate procedure, it may not suspend the time limits in rule
4. See Utah R. App. 2.
In sum, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely appeal.
2.

An appellate court must dismiss an untimely appeal.

This Court has stated that an appellate court must dismiss untimely appeals: [I]t is
'axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure to perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure,
requiring dismissal of the appeal'" Bowers, 2002 UT 100, \ 5 (quoting Prowswood v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984)) (emphasis added). Thus, once
an appellate court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, it has no choice but to dismiss the
appeal. See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37 ("Out-of-time appeals mustbe dismissed.") (emphasis
added); Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, lj 20, 44 P.3d 663 ("If we lack
jurisdiction, we must dismiss."); Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, f 8,5 P.3d 649 ("Where
an appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss."). Cf
State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Utah 1995) (if district court, at any point during trial,
becomes aware that it lacks jurisdiction, it "must immediately dismiss the action").
Because defendant has conceded the untimeliness of his appeal, the court of appeals
properly followed the foregoing authority and dismissed defendant's appeal.

7

3.

An appellate court can do nothing beyond dismissing an untimely appeal.

The question here, however, is whether the court of appeals could, in addition to
dismissing the appeal, temporarily remand to the district court with instructions to resentence
defendant so as to restart the time for appeal. It could not.
American courts, including both Utah courts, have universally recognized that a court
lacking jurisdiction has no authority to do anything but dismiss the case. See, e.g., Nebeker
v. Utah State Tax Comm yn, 2001 UT 74, \ 24, 34 P.3d 180 (citing Blaine Hudson Printing
v. Utah Tax Comm % 870 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah App. 1994), for proposition that an agency
without subject matter jurisdiction "lacks the power to do anything beyond dismissing the
proceedings"); Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989)
("When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the
action."); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987) ("Upon a
determination by the Court that its jurisdiction is lacking, its authority extends no further
than to dismiss the action."). See also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523
U.S. 83,94 (1998) ("Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the
only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause."); Blankenship v. Blankenship, 893 So.2d 303, 307 (Ala. 2004) (a court lacking
subject matter jurisdiction "may take no action other than to exercise its power to dismiss the
action"); Indiana Family andSoc. Servs. Admin, v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc., 756N.E.2d 567,
572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (where court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it is "without
jurisdiction to do anything in the case except to enter an order of dismissal"); University of
8

Kansas v. Dep't ofHuman Resources, 887 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) ("When
a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of an action, its authority extends no further than to
dismiss the action."); McCleese v. Todd, 591 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
("When a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, any action with respect to such
a cause, other than to dismiss it, is absolutely void"); State v. Oxenhandler, 159 S.W.3d 417,
420 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction "may take no action
other than to dismiss the suit"); Lurie v. Blackwell, 948 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Mont. 1997)
("Once a court has determined that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . the only further
action it can take is to dismiss the case."); St. John Medical Center v. Dep }t of Social and
Health Servs., 38 P.3d 383, 388 (Wash. App. 2002) ("A court lacking jurisdiction may do
nothing more than enter an order of dismissal."); Geerts v. Jacobsen, 100 P.3d 1265, 1269
(Wyo. 2004) (unless court has jurisdiction, "it lacks authority to proceed, and any decision,
judgment, or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void and of no effect for any

9

purpose").2 In other words, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction in an untimely appeal to
issue any orders except an order of dismissal.
The court of appeals correctly followed the foregoing universal rule when it dismissed
defendant's appeal and denied his motion to temporarily remand for resentencing. State v.
Cox, 2004 UT App 277, at 1 ("When a notice of appeal is untimely filed, this court lacks
jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss the action"). Granting defendant's motion
would have required the court of appeals to act without jurisdiction. The court of appeals,
therefore, properly dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction and declined to issue
an order clearly outside its jurisdiction.
2

See also Ex parte CL.C, 897 So.2d 234, 237 (Ala. 2004) ("[W]hen [a] court has
no power to sit, nor has general jurisdiction over that nature of proceeding or over the
parties, it cannot make any effective order.") (Brackets in original); People v. RiveraBottzeck, 2004 WL 3017269,
P.3d
(Colo. App. 2004) ("Any action taken by a
court which lacks jurisdiction is a nullity."); Diaz v. Provena Hospitals, 817 N.E.2d 206,
213 (111. Ct. App. 2004) ("An order or judgment is void if the court lacked personal or
subject matter jurisdiction or otherwise lacked the power to decide the particular matter
presented to it."); Ardoin v. Stine Lumber Co., Inc., 885 So.2d 43, 49 (La. Ct. App. 2004)
("As a general rule, any action taken by a court without proper subject-matter jurisdiction
is an absolute nullity."); Folk Integrated Technologies, Inc., v. Stack, 513 S.E.2d 572, 574
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999) ("A universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a
court without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity."); Trottier v. Bird, 635
N.W.2d 157, 159 (N.D. 2001) ("As a prerequisite to issuing a valid order or judgment, a
court must have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction."); Pratts v. Hurley, 806
N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ohio 2004) ("If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation
by that court is void."); Bancorp Group, Inc. v. Pirgos, Inc., 744 A.2d 791, 792 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000) ("[A]ction taken by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity.") (Brackets
in original); Suntrust Bank, Nashville v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Term. Ct. App.
2000) ("Without subject matter jurisdiction, a court cannot enter valid, enforceable
order"); Green v. State, 906 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 1995) ("[I]t is . . .
axiomatic that where there is no jurisdiction, the power of the court to act is as absent as
if it did not exist,... and any order entered by a court having no jurisdiction is void.")
(Brackets in original and internal quotation marks omitted).
10

B.

This Court has always followed the universal rule that an appellate court lacks
authority to do anything but to dismiss an untimely appeal, even when it appears
on the record that defendant lost his appeal due to counsel's ineffectiveness.
Defendant acknowledges that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over his appeal

Br. Pet. 9. But, he argues, "[wjhile an appellate court may lack jurisdiction to consider a
direct appeal from defendant's convictions, the lack of jurisdiction does not preclude the
court from saying something about the matter." Id.
Defendant is correct that a lack of jurisdiction does not prevent a court from "saying
something" about the matter. Id. Indeed, as defendant rightly points out, appellate courts
lacking jurisdiction sometimes issue what are, in effect, advisory opinions suggesting
procedures to be followed to invoke the court's jurisdiction or to otherwise obtain relief. See,
e.g., State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 1981) (dismissing untimely appeal, but
explaining how defendant may still obtain direct appellate review by seeking resentencing
in post-conviction proceedings); State v. Jiminez, 93 8 P.2d 264,265 (Utah 1997) (dismissing
untimely appeal, but informing defendant that he may seek Johnson resentencing through
post-conviction petition). But while a lack of jurisdiction does not prevent a court from
"saying something," it does, as explained above, prevent a court from ordering something.
Moreover, defendant here did not ask the court of appeals to merely "say something"
about jurisdiction. Rather, he asked the court of appeals not to dismiss his untimely appeal,
and to temporarily remand with an order directing the district court to resentence him. Add.
C. at 1-2. In other words, defendant asked the court of appeals to help him cure the
jurisdictional defect in his appeal by, in effect, enlarging the time for appeal. Such an order
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would have been a clear violation of rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
prohibits an appellate court from suspending the time limits in rule 4. The court of appeals,
therefore, correctly held that it had only the power to dismiss the appeal and that it lacked
jurisdiction to temporarily remand with an order in effect granting defendant relief in the
form of resentencing.
In State v. Johnson, this Court recognized that it was powerless to grant the relief
defendant seeks. Johnson, like defendant, also filed an untimely notice of appeal. Johnson,
635 P.2d at 37. Johnson claimed that he asked his attorney to file an appeal within the 30day time limit, but his attorney failed to do so. Id. Thus, Johnson, like defendant, claimed
that his attorney alone was to blame for his untimely notice of appeal. Id. at 37. Johnson
asked this Court to extend the time for appeal so that he could obtain direct appellate review
of his conviction. Id.
This Court noted that the "30-day period for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case
is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by this Court." Id. (citations omitted). Because it
lacked jurisdiction over the untimely appeal, this Court explained that it had to deny
Johnson's request, and dismiss the appeal. See id.
But this Court was concerned that defendant had been denied both his state
constitutional right to appeal his conviction and his federal constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 37-38. Accordingly, the Court explained—for the
benefit of Johnson, lower courts, and future similarly-situated defendants—how Johnson
should proceed to obtain a direct appeal. Id.
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The Court first explained that Johnson's "remedy to establish the denial of his right
to appeal is not in this Court; it lies in the district court, which can receive evidence
(including the taking of oral testimony, if necessary) and make findings of fact." Id. at 38.
The Court then instructed Johnson to seek this remedy under then-applicable post-conviction
procedures. Id. If Johnson could prove that he lost his right to appeal as a result of his
counsel's ineffectiveness, the district court could grant relief by resentencing Johnson so as
to restart the time for appeal. Id. In this way, Johnson could timely invoke this Court's
appellate jurisdiction.
The Johnson court, however, did not remand to the district court to hold a hearing on
Johnson's factual allegations. Nor did it remand to the district court with instructions to
resentence Johnson. Rather, it simply dismissed the appeal—just as it said it must do given
its lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 37-38.
Defendant suggests that this Court may nevertheless remand and direct resentencing
because, unlike in Johnson, "the existing record [in this case] already supports that counsel
was ineffective in perfecting [defendant]'s appeal." Br. Pet. 29. Thus, defendant reasons,
there is no need to require him to resort to post-conviction proceedings for the purpose of
developing a factual record. Id.
But Johnson's dismissal of the appeal was based, not on the lack of a settled factual
predicate, but on the Court's lack ofjurisdiction over an untimely appeal. See Johnson, 635
P.2d at 37. Thus, even if the record in Johnson had conclusively established counsel's
ineffectiveness, the Court still lacked jurisdiction and so was still required to dismiss the
13

appeal. See id. See also State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264,265 (Utah 1997). Because the Court
had authority to only dismiss, it necessarily lacked jurisdiction to issue any other orders.
This Court's post-Johnson opinions are consistent with this approach. For example,
in State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264 (Utah 1997), the defendant lost his right to appeal because
his attorney did not file a timely notice of appeal after the trial court had disposed of his
timely new trial motion. This Court dismissed because it lacked jurisdiction over the
untimely appeal. Id. Although it appeared as obvious from that record as it does from this
one that Jiminez lost his right to appeal because of his counsel's procedural missteps, this
Court did not remand to the district court for resentencing. Rather, it dismissed the appeal
and informed Jiminez that he could seek resentencing in the trial court by filing a postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and rule 65C, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id.
The defendant in State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, likewise lost the right to appeal his
conviction due to his attorney's procedural missteps. Bowers timely filed a motion to arrest
judgment between verdict and sentencing. Id. at % 2; see Utah R. App. P. 23. Unlike a rule
24 motion for new trial, however, a rule 23 motion to arrest judgment does not toll the time
for appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b). The trial court issued its findings, conclusions, and
order denying the motion to arrest judgment after sentencing, but before the time for appeal
had passed. Id. at *|fl[ 2-3. Bowers filed his notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of
his motion to arrest judgement, but more than 30 days after sentencing. Id. at ^ 3-4. This
Court dismissed Bowers's untimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at f 5.
14

Again, it was just as obvious from the procedural history in Bowers as it is here, that
Bowers lost his appeal due to his counsel's ineffectiveness. Yet this Court did not remand
to the trial court for resentencing. Indeed, it did not even inform Bowers that he could seek
resentencing through post-conviction proceedings. Rather, this Court affirmed that the 30day limit for appealing was jurisdictional, that the Court did not have the power to enlarge
the time for appeal or "to transubstantiate an untimely notice of appeal into timely one," and
that "failure to perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure, requiring dismissal of the appeal."
Id. atf 5.
After Bowers, this Court affirmed the dismissal of a criminal appeal on procedural
facts identical to this case. See State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, 63 P.3d 91. Putnik, like
defendant, filed a premature, and therefore untimely, motion for new trial. Id. atfflf1, 8.
While Putnik's notice of appeal was timely as to the denial of his new trial motion, it was
untimely as to his sentence. Id. at ^f 1, 4. Accordingly, the court of appeals dismissed
Putnik's appeal. Id. at^f 1.
On certiorari review, this Court simply affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal of
Putnik's appeal:
Because petitioner did not file his motion for a new trial within the time frame
mandated in rule 24, he was required to file his motion for appeal within thirty
days of sentencing. He failed to do so. The court of appeals properly
dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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Id. at f 10. However obvious it may have been that Putnik lost his appeal due to his
counsel's mistakes, this Court neither remanded nor ordered resentencing. Id. Nor did this
Court tell Putnik how he could obtain a direct appeal through resentencing. Id.
In short, none of this Court's precedent supports defendant's contention that an
appellate court may, in an untimely appeal, remand to the district court with instructions to
resentence the defendant.

To the contrary, Johnson, Jiminez, Bowers, and Putnik all

followed the universal rule—that a court lacking jurisdiction retains only the authority to
dismiss the action. The court of appeals, therefore, did not err in following that precedent.
C.

This Court's inherent supervisory powers may not be invoked to circumvent the
time limits of rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
For the first time in this case, defendant asserts that this Court "may invoke its

supervisory powers to remand for resentencing in a case, even when it lacks jurisdiction over
an appeal from the convictions." Br. Pet. 11. Defendant did not argue this claim to the court
of appeals, see Add. C, nor did he raise it in his petition for certiorari review. This Court
should therefore decline to address this claim.
In any event, defendant has no valid supervisory authority claim. On certiorari, this
Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for error. See State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35, ^f 8,
P.3d

. Here, even if defendant had raised the claim below, the court of appeals could

not have remanded pursuant to "inherent supervisory authority," because—as will become
apparent below—the court of appeals, unlike this Court, has no such authority. Thus, the
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court of appeals did not err in not invoking its supervisory authority to remand for
resentencing.
But should this Court nevertheless address this issue for the first on certiorari review,
no precedent supports defendant's supervisory authority argument.
"This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which has been recognized in
many cases." State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, f 13, 999 P.2d 1 (Durham, J., concurring in the
result) (citing 15 cases). Citing to the Utah Constitution, Justice Durrant has suggested that
it "stems from [the Court's] authority Ho adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used
in the courts of the state.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \ 81, 63 P.3d 621 (Durrant, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (quoting Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4). Article VIII,
section 4 of the Utah Constitution could in fact be read to mean that the Court's supervisory
power is limited to rule-making: "The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process."
While this Court has invoked its "inherent supervisory power" with some frequency
since State ex rel Clatter buck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1985), its precise sources,
character, and limits remain unclear. Its bounds have never been staked or even debated.
Indeed, this power is so ill-defined that one justice of this Court, referring to "our so-called
supervisory powers," added, "whatever that means apart from our appellate power." State
v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 360 n.6 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, J. dissenting). Similarly, the
question of whether to invoke supervisory power to fill perceived gaps in state criminal rules
or constitutional provisions recently splintered this Court. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^f 45
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(Durham, C J.),fflf80-83 (Durrant, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); ^[ 140-41
(Russon, J. dissenting in part and concurring in part).
1.

No precedent permits this Court to invoke its supervisory authority in
order to exercise jurisdiction in an untimely appeal.

Whatever parameters might surround this Court's supervisory authority, this Court
may not invoke it to create jurisdiction where none exists. This Court's appellate jurisdiction
is determined by statute. Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all matters to be exercised as provided by statute"). See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 (setting forth this Court's appellate jurisdiction). Thus, this Court could not invoke
its inherent supervisory power to take jurisdiction over an appeal that had not been assigned
to it by statute. Likewise, as explained, rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, expressly
prohibits this Court from suspending the time requirements of rule 4. Thus, this Court clearly
could not invoke its supervisory authority to nevertheless circumvent those jurisdictional time
limits. Yet that is what defendant asks this Court to do. By remanding this untimely appeal
with an order for the district court to resentence defendant, the Court would, in effect, be
circumventing the time limits in rule 4 by enlarging the time for appeal. This the Court may
not do. See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37.
Significantly, defendant cites no published decision in which this Court exercised its
supervisory authority to assume jurisdiction where none existed. Indeed, all cases in which
this Court has invoked its supervisory authority have dealt with what is essentially ad hoc
rule-making by the Court or oversight of the administration of lower courts. See, e.g., State
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v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 43 9,442 (Utah 1996) (stating in effective assistance of counsel case
that "pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, we may presume prejudice
in circumstances where it is unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to
weigh actual prejudice"); State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629,650 (Utah 1995) (advising, pursuant
to inherent supervisory power, that trial courts should be more conservative in ruling on forcause challenges to jurors in capital cases); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 407 n.7 (Utah
1994) (stating that language changes made in other cases to burden of proof instruction were
undertaken pursuant to court's supervisory power over lower courts); State v. Thurman, 846
P.2d 1256, 1266, 1271-72 (Utah 1993) (invoking "inherent supervisory authority over all
courts of this state" to establish appropriate standards of review); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d
851, 857 (Utah 1992) (holding, pursuant to court's inherent supervisory power over courts,
that "counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend
indigent persons"); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah 1989) (adopting, pursuant
to court's supervisory power, bifurcated hearing process in simple sexual abuse/aggravated
sexual abuse cases); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 1989) (invoking court's
inherent supervisory power over trial courts to adopt bifurcated hearing process in first
degree murder trials where evidence of prior convictions is introduced); In re Criminal
Investigations, IthDist. Court No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633,653 (Utah 1988) (invoking inherent
supervisory power over judicial branch to require that all criminal investigations under
Subpoena Powers Act "be fully documented" and that such documentation "be maintained
by the district court authorizing the investigation"); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,499 (Utah
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1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in result) (noting that requiring trials to proceed in
bifurcated fashion to prevent evidence of prior convictions in murder trial is "entirely within
our inherent power to supervise the courts"), overruled in part on other grounds byMenzies,
889 P.2d at 397-98; State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988) (calling on court's
inherent supervisory power to impose requirements of instructions and written findings on
proof of aggravating circumstances in penalty phase of capital case); State ex rel
Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1985) (exercising inherent supervisory power to
require detailed findings and reasons for certifying juveniles to adult court); Hi-Country
Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. Bagley & Co., 2000 UT 27, f , 996 P.2d 534 (in timely
interlocutory appeal, exercising "authority to supervise and oversee the administration of the
lower courts of this state" to review presiding judge's decision in unsigned minute entry to
reassign case under Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 3-104(3)(E) (1999)).
None of those cases involved this Court invoking its supervisory authority in an
untimely appeal to remand for resentencing. Rather, the appellant in each of the foregoing
cases had properly invoked the Court's jurisdiction by filing a timely notice of appeal.
Defendant acknowledges that Johnson says nothing about the Court's supervisory
authority, but he nevertheless claims that this Court in effect exercised that authority by
adopting a new procedure that permitted a criminal defendant to seek resentencing when he
was denied his right to appeal. Br. Pet. 13-17. Defendant seems to argue that if Johnson
adopted a new procedural rule that permitted resentencing, this Court may invoke its
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supervisory authority now to extend that rule to permit an appellate court in an untimely
appeal to remand for automatic resentencing.
Johnson, however, did not adopt a new rule of procedure. It simply pointed the
defendant to an existing procedure—post-conviction proceedings—as a means for proving
that he was denied his right to appeal and for obtaining relief in the form of resentencing.
But Johnson does not help defendant's cause for a more fundamental reason.
Whatever the Johnson court had to say about the correct procedure for resentencing, it did
not exercise its supervisory authority to remand with an order to resentence defendant. It
instead properly recognized its jurisdictional limitations over an untimely appeal and it
dismissed the appeal with the explanation that defendant could seek a remedy with a court
that would have jurisdiction. Johnson 635 P.2d at 38. In sum, Johnson does not represent
an exercise of this Court's inherent supervisory authority. Certainly, it does not support
defendant's claim that this Court may exercise its inherent supervisory power to formulate
rules that allow it to act outside its jurisdiction.3

3

Defendant spends much of his brief arguing that Johnson permits him to seek
resentencing by filing a motion in the underlying criminal case instead of by filing a
separate civil post-conviction petition. Br. Pet. 13-16,23-29. That, however, is not the
issue before this Court. Defendant has not sought resentencing in the district court. He
has only sought an appellate remedy. The only question before this Court is whether the
court of appeals had jurisdiction to grant him that remedy. The notes, however, that the
question of the appropriate procedure to use in seeking resentencing in the district court is
currently before this Court in Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196, cert,
granted by 98 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004).
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2.

Defendant improperly relies on unpublished orders from other appeals to
support his claims.

Because no published authority supports his position, defendant resorts to citing to
unpublished orders issued by this Court: State v. Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; State v.
Munford;CaseNo.2Q0lQ4l3-SC;mdStatev. flawaw, Case No. 20020885-SC. Br. Pet. 11.
According to defendant, these orders support his claim that this Court "may invoke its
supervisory power to remand for resentencing in a case, even where it lacks jurisdiction over
an appeal from the convictions." Id.
The Munford order, issued on 31 July 2001, states:
The State's motion to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction is
granted, but the case is remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing and
appointment of counsel, so that defendant may perfect his appeal as of right.
See Br. Pet., Addendum. E. The Clark order was issued approximately six months later on
17 January 2002. It states:
The State's motion to dismiss is granted, but the case is remanded to the
trial court for resentencing, so that defendant may exercise his constitutional
right to appeal. In remanding the case, this court invokes its supervisory
powers, where it is obvious from the record that defendant was denied his
constitutional right to appeal by an attorney who has since been suspended
from the practice of law and where fundamental values are threatened by other
modes of proceedings. State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, «|j 13, 999 P.2d 1.
See Br. Pet., Addendum D. The Hassan order, issued on 21 April 2003, states:
The court denies defendant's motion for order affirming this court's
jurisdiction over his appeal. The court grants defendant's motion for order
remanding his case to the trial court for re-sentencing. This court invokes its
authority to remand the case under section 78-2-2(2) which vests this court
with "authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
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orders, judgments, and decrees." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2) (2001). The
Court denies the State's motion to dismiss the appeal.
Br. Pet., Addendum F.
As a threshold matter, defendant's citation to these orders as precedent is improper.
In Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25,ffif16-17,44 P.3d 734, this Court held that parties
could cite to unpublished court of appeals' memorandum decisions "to the degree that they
are useful, authoritatively and persuasively." Id. at^ 16. In so holding, this Court explained
that such decisions are "issued and distributed as are all other opinions, except for the fact
that they are not published in the Utah Advance Reports or the West reporter system." Id.
Moreover, the court of appeals' memorandum decisions are "generally available to the bar
and public through the internet service provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts."
Id. Accordingly, this Court held that such decisions could be "presented as precedential
authority to a lower court or as persuasive authority to this [C]ourt, so long as all parties and
the court are supplied with accurate copies at the time the decision is first cited." Id. at 16.
The Court recognized, however, that the precedential value of memorandum decisions may
be limited, given the tendency of such decisions to omit procedural and substantive
background and to forego detailed analysis. Id. at ^[ 16-17.
Prior to Grand County, the Rules of Judicial Administration expressly prohibited
parties from citing to unpublished decisions in any state court. Id. at ^f 16 n.4 (citing Utah
R. Jud. Admin. 4-508). After Grand County, this Court amended its appellate rules to permit
parties to cite "as precedent" both "[p]ublished decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court
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of Appeals'5 and "[unpublished decisions," so long as accurate copies of the unpublished
decisions were provided to all parties and the court. Utah R. App. P. 30(f). Defendant cites
to rule 30, presumably as authority for citing to these three orders.
But neither rule 30 nor Grand County support relying on such orders as precedent.
Rule 30, adopted the year after Grand County was issued, was clearly intended to formally
incorporate Grand County's new rule into the appellate rules of procedure. Moreover, the
term "decisions" as used in rule 30 clearly does not contemplate the type of orders that
defendant cites. The term "decisions" in rule 30 is distinguished by two modifiers:
"published" and "unpublished." Utah R. App. P. 30(f). Obviously, "published decisions"
refer to the opinions issued by this Court and the court of appeals that are published in the
official reporter. See Grand County, 2002 UT 25, \ 7. "Unpublished decisions" then must
refer to same type of decision, but which is not published in the official reporter. Given the
context of the term and in light of Grand County, "decision" cannot possibly refer to the kind
of brief, unpublished orders defendant now cites.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine when an unpublished order such as these would have
any useful precedential value, given that such orders tend to have even less analysis and
background than unpublished memorandum decisions. None of these orders contains any
procedural or factual background, nor any supporting analysis or reasoning, although they
were clearly issued in response to motions to dismiss the appeal. Moreover, while
unpublished memorandum decisions are made "available to the bar and public through the
internet service provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts" and on research
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databases such as WestLaw and Lexis, the orders cited here were not. They were distributed
only to the parties in the case. Thus, other litigants searching for authority to cite would be
unable to access these orders. This alone demonstrates that this Court did not intend for
these orders to have any binding or precedential value for other cases.
But even if these orders could be properly cited as precedent, they provide no
guidance as to whether this Court may invoke its supervisory authority in an untimely appeal.
Neither the Munford nor Hassan orders uses the term "inherent supervisory authority." The
Clark order is the only one to use that term. But even so, the Clark order provides no
explanatory background into the basis for the order. Consequently, it contributes nothing to
the issue here. And, more importantly, to the extent that the Clark order supports defendant's
argument, it represents a departure from the well-established jurisdictional rules set out in
published opinions cited above. As such, any possible precedential value is de minimis.
In sum, this Court's supervisory authority may not be invoked in order to create
jurisdiction where none exists or to circumvent the jurisdictional time frame for appeal.
D.

The state constitutional and statutory "AH Writs" provisions do not permit an
appellate court to take any action other than dismissal in an untimely appeal.
The Utah Constitution grants this Court "appellate jurisdiction over all other matters

to be exercised as provided by statute" and "power to issue all writs and orders necessary for
the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause."
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3.

Statute also grants this Court "jurisdiction to issue all

extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
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its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2
(West 2004).

Statute likewise grants the court of appeals jurisdiction "to issue all

extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: (a) to carry into effect its
judgments, orders, and decrees; or (b) in aid of its jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(1) (West 2004).
1.

Neither this Court nor the court of appeals may issue a writ "in aid o f
non-existent jurisdiction.

In the court of appeals, defendant argued that the court could remand for resentencing
by issuing a writ under the "in aid of its jurisdiction" provision of section 78-2a-3(l)(b). See
Cox, 2004 UT App 277, at 2. Defendant renews that claim here.
The court of appeals stated in response to defendant's argument that the authority
granted under subsection (l)(b) "presumes that this court has appropriate jurisdiction" and
"does not confer jurisdiction where this court does not otherwise have it because of an
untimely notice of appeal." Id.
The court of appeals' reading of that statutory provision is correct. The phrase "in aid
of its jurisdiction" by its terms presupposes that the court already has jurisdiction over the
matter. Otherwise, a writ could not be "in aid of'jurisdiction. This reading is supported by
federal decisions interpreting a similar phrase in federal statutes. For example, in United
States v. Crockett, 861 A.2d 604, 610 (D.C. 2004), the court held that "in aid of their
respective jurisdictions" in 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) does not "create an independent basis for
jurisdiction where the court otherwise had none." The United States Supreme Court likewise
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interpreted the phrase "in aid of its jurisdiction" in 28 U.S.C. § 2283, to presuppose
jurisdiction in the first place. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,294 (1970) (holding that, "if the District Court does have jurisdiction,
it is not enough that the requested injunction is related to that jurisdiction, but it must be
'necessary in aid of that jurisdiction"). See also James v. X. Bellotti, 733 F.2d 989, 993 (1st
Cir. 1984) ("[T]he district court's jurisdiction to issue an injunction under the [in aid of its
jurisdiction] exception[] in section 2283 is ancillary to its jurisdiction in the underlying
case"); In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation, 369 F.3d 293, 306 (3rd Cir. 2004)
(federal district court, pursuant to its authority to issue injunctions that are necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, may enjoin state court action that if allowed, would "run afoul" of a
settlement agreement that the federal court retained exclusive jurisdiction over); Signal
Properties, Inc. v. Farha, et. al., 482 F.2d 1136, 1140 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he district court
should be able to issue an injunction in aid of its jurisdiction to prevent the [state] court from
continuing multiplicitous proceedings, from rendering a decision which could effectively
deprive the federal court of its in rem jurisdiction through principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel, or from rendering a decision potentially inconsistent with a decision of
the federal district court"); Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1972)
("[Section] 2283 is a limitation on the exercise by the federal courts of their equitable
jurisdiction, but is not a jurisdictional statute"); Tyler v. Russel, 410 F.2d 490,491 (10th Cir.
1969) ("Section 2283 is not a jurisdictional statute but rather a limitation upon the exercise
by a district court of its equity jurisdiction"); Henson v. Hoth, 258 F. Supp. 33,35 (D. Colo.
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1996) (The phrase, "in aid of its jurisdiction" in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 "refers only to jurisdiction
which has already attached, it cannot be considered an original jurisdictional grant").
Defendant relies on Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679, 681 (Utah App. 1994)
("Barnard IF) to support his argument that an appellate court may issue a writ "in aid of its
jurisdiction," even when it lacks jurisdiction. Br. Pet. 19-20. Barnard II, however, is
inapposite because it involved an original writ proceeding. Barnard, a lawyer, had moved
the trial judge to recuse himself from several cases in which Barnard represented a party. Id.
at 680-81. As required by rule, the trial judge certified one affidavit to another judge, but
took no action in the other cases. Id.

Barnard petitioned the court of appeals for

extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus. Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023, 1024
(Utah App. 1993) ("Barnard7"). The court of appeals granted the writ and ordered the trial
judge to immediately comply with the applicable rule on judicial disqualification. Id. at
1025. The trial judge then referred all but two of the affidavits to another judge. Id.
In BarnardII, Barnard petitioned the court of appeals for another extraordinary writ,
also in the nature of mandamus, ordering the trial judge to comply with the rule in the last
two cases. 882 P.2d at 681. The petition also asked the court to direct the trial judge's
recusal from all cases in which Barnard filed an affidavit of bias. Id.
The court of appeals held in BarnardII that it had jurisdiction over the second petition
for extraordinary relief under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(a), which grants that court "all
writs and process necessary: (a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees." Id.
at 681. The court of appeals reasoned that since it had already ordered the trial judge to
28

comply with the disqualification rule in the respective cases, issuing the second writ "would
only be "carry[ing] into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees." Id. In other words, the
court of appeals "could properly issue a writ to enforce [its] prior order." Id.
The Barnard II court then went on to hold that it also had jurisdiction to issue the
second writ under the "in aid ofjurisdiction" provision. Id. The court reasoned that because
it had general appellate jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases at issue—i.e., divorce
cases—the writ could properly issue "in aid of its jurisdiction," "even if no appeal is
pending." Id.
A pending appeal was unnecessary to invoke the court of appeals' jurisdiction in
Barnard II, however, because its jurisdiction had been invoked by an original writ
proceedings. Because of the court of appeals has original appellate jurisdiction over divorce
cases, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h), there was no question that it, not this Court, was
the appropriate court for seeking extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus.
In this case, defendant did not attempt to invoke the writ jurisdiction of either
appellate court through an original writ proceeding. Rather, he unsuccessfully tried to invoke
the this Court's appellate jurisdiction by filing an untimely notice of appeal. Thus, while the
Barnard II court had underlying jurisdiction over the original writ proceeding, the court of
appeal never had jurisdiction over defendant's untimely appeal. Thus, the court of appeals
could not issue a writ "in aid o f its non-existent jurisdiction.
Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981) ("Boggess 11% on the other hand, is a
perfect example of a writ issued "in aid of an appellate court's jurisdiction. Boggess was
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issued on the same day as Johnson. Boggess, like Johnson, had initially filed an untimely
notice ofappeal from his manslaughter conviction. Id. at 40. Boggess filed a habeas petition
in the district court alleging that he had timely asked his counsel to appeal, but that his
counsel had failed to file a notice ofappeal. Id. at 40-41. After taking evidence, the district
court found Boggess's allegations to be true and ruled that he "had been denied his right to
appeal and his right to counsel." Id. at 40. In an attempt to afford Boggess relief, the district
court entered an order granting him "permission to file an out-of-time appeal and directing
him to return to the district court for further relief if this Court refused to entertain that
appeal." Id.
Without addressing the merits of Boggess's claims, this Court dismissed the untimely
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979) ^Boggess F).
Accordingly, Boggess returned to the district court for habeas relief. Boggess II, 635 P.2d
at 40-41. The district court ordered that if this Court did not take jurisdiction "of the
substantive merits of an appeal by [Boggess] within thirty (30) days," it would grant
Boggess's habeas petition and release him from prison." Id. at 41. Thirty days later, the
district court vacated defendant's conviction and released him from custody, with the
understanding that the State could reprosecute Boggess. Id. The State timely appealed the
order granting habeas relief. Id.
Citing to Johnson, this Court explained that ordinarily a defendant denied his right to
appeal should seek resentencing through post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 42. The Court
noted, however, "the unusual circumstances of this case, where the facts [had] already been
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established by findings in a habeas corpus proceeding." Id. Under these circumstances, the
Court stated, "it would be needlessly circular to require that defendant return to the district
court to re-establish the facts by a postconviction hearing and then to be resentenced to
qualify for a direct appeal." Id.
This Court noted that while Boggess's criminal conviction was "no longer subject to
review by the statutory remedy of appeal," the habeas proceeding was properly before the
Court on appeal. Id. at 43. "In that circumstance, where this Court has appellate jurisdiction
over the habeas corpus proceeding and original jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari for
the record in the criminal conviction, the effect of the two writs can unite to open the door
for direct review of a criminal conviction in this Court." Id. In other words, where this
Court already had appellate jurisdiction over the habeas proceeding, it could issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of that jurisdiction to provide Boggess with relief. See also State v. Hallett,
856 P.2d 1060,1061-62 (Utah 1993) (approving court of appeals' use of Boggess procedure
in nearly identical circumstances).
This Court cautioned, however, that this procedure was not "available as an alternate
means of review." Id. Otherwise, "these two writs could make a mockery of the time limits
for appeal, undermine the finality of criminal judgments, and promote the indefensible
merry-go-round of collateral attack." Id.
Moreover, it is significant that the remedy in Boggess was neither offered nor afforded
Johnson. This is because this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction over Johnson's appeal and
because Johnson had not yet established the factual allegations that would entitle him to
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resentencing. Defendant's circumstances here mirror Johnson's, not Boggess's. Like the
Johnson court, this Court lacks jurisdiction over defendant's untimely appeal. And unlike
the Boggess court, this Court has no appellate jurisdiction over a habeas proceeding. Thus,
this Court should grant defendant the same remedy that it granted Johnson: dismissal of the
untimely appeal with the advice thai defendant seek a resentencing order in postconviction
proceedings in the district court.
2.

Defendant's argument that this Court has independent jurisdiction to
issue a writ to order resentencing is unpreserved.

For the first time before this Court, defendant argues that this Court has power to issue
a writ "independent of appellate jurisdiction over a case." Br. Pet. 17. Defendant neither
raised this argument in the court of appeals, see Add. C, nor in his petition for certiorari
review. Rather, he argued only that the court of appeals had authority to remand with an
order of resentencing pursuant to its statutory writ power "in aid of its jurisdiction." He
should not be permitted at this late date to raise this new appellate claim, which is not fairly
included in his petition for certiorari review.
In any event, the fact that both this Court and the court of appeals have the authority
to issue extraordinary writs independent of their appellate jurisdiction does not aid defendant.
First, defendant did not invoke the court of appeals' statutory authority to issue a writ for
extraordinary relief. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3. Rather, he asked only for a writ "in aid
o f the court of appeals' jurisdiction. But even if defendant had sought extraordinary relief,
it would not have been available to him. Extraordinary writs have always been available only
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when "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available." See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B.
See also Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice, 2003 UT 15, \ 24, 70 P.3d 58. Here,
defendant had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy—an appeal. See Commercial Security
Bank v. Phillips, 655 P.2d 678, 679-80 (Utah 1982) (plaintiffs who did not exercise right to
appeal district court's adverse ruling could not substitute that "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law" with petition for extraordinary relief). Also, as held by Johnson, defendant
has an plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law in the form of post-conviction proceedings
seeking resentencing.4
E.

Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is not a mechanism for an appellate
court to order relief from an untimely appeal.
Defendant argues that rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "would accommodate

a request for relief under the circumstances here." Br. Pet. 31. Assuming for the sake of
argument, but not conceding that this rule of civil procedure even applies in criminal
proceedings, defendant has not explained how this rule may be invoked for the first time in
the appellate court in an untimely appeal. As the court of appeals stated, rule 60(b) is a rule
of civil procedure "to be invoked in the trial court." Cox, 2004 UT 277, at 2 (emphasis
added). "It is not appropriate to bring a motion under rule 60(b) in [an appellate] court for
4

Defendant also failed to follow the correct procedures for invoking either this
Court's or the court of appeals' authority to issue an extraordinary writ. Extraordinary
relief procedures are governed by rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Osborne,
2003 UT 15, <[ 23. That rule requires that a separate petition seeking relief be filed. Utah
R. Civ. P. 65B. Defendant here filed no petition for extraordinary relief. He merely
argued in his untimely appeal that the court of appeals should act outside its jurisdiction
and grant him relief. Moreover, it is unclear whether defendant could establish any of the
grounds for relief set forth in rule 65B.
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the first time." Id. Indeed, the State knows of no authority that permits an appellant to bring
such a motion in the appellate count, even when the court's jurisdiction has been properly
invoked. It defies reason to assume that an appellate court would have jurisdiction to grant
rule 60(b) motion in an untimely appeal over which the court lacks jurisdiction.
F.

Good policy does not support an appellate court acting outside its jurisdiction.
Defendant finally argues that policy supports remand for resentencing because "it

conserves resources, it is fundamentally fair, and it does not prejudice the State." Br. Pet.
37.
As a threshold matter, a court may not act outside its jurisdiction no matter how many
policy considerations argue for it to do so. And acting without jurisdiction is always bad
policy. As explained in the beginning of this argument, the court of appeals lacked
jurisdiction over defendant's untimely appeal and, accordingly, had power only to dismiss
the appeal. Thus, defendant's policy arguments are irrelevant to the question at hand.
But defendant's policy arguments are also incorrect. First, it does not necessarily
conserve resources for an appellate court to remand the case with an order to the district court
to resentence the defendant. Whether the appellate court issues a remand or requires the
defendant to seek an order of resentencing in the district court, the case has to be sent back
to the district court for the resentencing. If the case must go back to the district court in
either case, it is little more trouble for the defendant to file a petition in the district court
seeking resentencing relief. Indeed, defendant here is represented by able counsel who can
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file a simple petition that will take far less time to prepare than has the appellate briefing
already submitted on the issue.
Moreover, whether a defendant is entitled to resentencing is, as Johnson noted, a
factual issue better suited to resolution in the trial court. Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38-39. If, as
defendant claims, the record obviously demonstrates that he was denied his right to appeal
due to his counsel's ineffectiveness, he should have no problem establishing that fact to the
district court. Indeed, the State routinely stipulates to the grant of a post-conviction petition
and resentencing when the record facts indisputably demonstrate that the defendant was
denied his right to appeal. Also, in obvious cases, there is no reason why the post-conviction
petition and resentencing hearings cannot be scheduled at the same time.
Second, requiring defendant to seek a resentencing order in the district court is not
fundamentally unfair. As stated, the procedure is simple and in obvious cases can be
expedited. Moreover, fundamental unfairness is more likely to result under defendant's
proposed procedure. As explained above, this Court has often dismissed the untimely
appeals of criminal defendants who are in the same position as defendant. See Jiminez, 938
P.2d at 264; Bowers, 2002 UT 100; Putnik, 2002 UT 122. The record facts in those cases
were no less obvious than this case in demonstrating that their appeals were lost due to their
counsel's procedural missteps. Yet this Court did not remand with an order to resentence
them. It instead dismissed each case for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant asks that his case
be given preferential treatment.
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This Court has observed, however, that it is unjust to afford preferential treatment to
some defendants, but not others:
[G]iven the fact that we have routinely dismissed appeals that were improperly
taken, even after briefing and argument, we bear a heavy burden of
justification when we single out one improperly taken appeal for preferential
treatment that has been denied so many others. The essence of justice is to
treat similar cases similarly. Until we can explain persuasively why any one
case deserves treatment denied to others, we should deny extraordinary
treatment.
A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Construction Co., Inc.,, 817 P.2d 323, 325-26 (Utah 1991)
(citations omitted).5
Defendant advances no reason why he should be granted preferential treatment over
all other defendants who have filed untimely appeals because of their counsel's
ineffectiveness. Indeed, it makes little sense to have one jurisdictional rule for those cases
in which it appears obvious that counsel was ineffective and those in which it is not so
obvious. As a practical matter, such a line would be difficult to draw objectively. One case
might appear obvious to one person, but would not necessarily appear obvious to another.
This leads to defendant's final claim that remanding for automatic sentencing would
not prejudice the State. As stated, the State often stipulates to the grant of a post-conviction
petition and resentencing when a defendant demonstrates that he was denied his right to
5

A. J. Mackay involved a civil appeal that was improperly certified under rule
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Holding that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction
over appeals improperly certified under rule 54(b), this Court noted that in "extraordinary
cases" it could "choose to treat a purported [appellate rule 3 appeal of right] as an
interlocutory appeal under [appellate rule 5]." Id. at 325. It declined to do so in A. J.
Mackay, however, because the Court would have denied a petition for interlocutory
review. Id. at 326.
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appeal because of his counsel's ineffectiveness. The State will not stipulate to resentencing,
however, when a defendant consciously foregoes his right to appeal by pleading guilty or
instructing his counsel not to file a notice of appeal. Allowing a defendant to circumvent
post-conviction proceedings in the district court deprives the State of the opportunity to
dispute or test defendant's factual allegations that he was denied his right to appeal through
the fault of counsel.
The situation in Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196, cert, granted by, 98
P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004), illustrates this point. Manning filed an untimely notice of appeal
from her conviction and sentence entered on her guilty pleas. Id. As defendant does here,
Manning argued that court of appeals should not dismiss her untimely appeal; rather the court
should simply remand with directions to the district court to resentence her. See State v.
Manning, 2002 UT App 114 (unpublished memorandum decision) (attached at Addendum
D). The court of appeals refused, stating that since it lacked jurisdiction over the untimely
appeal, it had no authority to do anything but dismiss. Id.
Manning subsequently filed a post-conviction petition in the district court, claiming
that she was denied her right to appeal due to her counsel's ineffectiveness. Manning v.
State, 2004 UT App, \ 7. The State disputed that claim and after holding a hearing, the
district court found that rather than being denied her right to appeal, Manning had merely
chosen not to exercise that right. Id.. Accordingly, the district court held that Manning was
not entitled to resentencing under Johnson, See id. The court of appeals affirmed that ruling

37

and the case is currently under submission before this Court on a writ of certiorari. Id. at f
35.
The point is that if the court of appeals had granted Manning's original request to
remand for automatic resentencing, the State would have been deprived of its right to dispute
the claim that Manning was entitled to be resentenced. Moreover, while it may appear
obvious on some records that a defendant has been denied her right to appeal, the reality is
that there are often conflicting extra-record facts that the appellate court will be unaware of.
Thus, it will be impossible for an appellate court to always determine which cases warrant
resentencing and which cases do not. Consequently, the only way to ensure fair and evenhanded treatment for both the State and all defendants is to require the procedure set out in
Johnson in all cases—i.e, dismiss the untimely appeal and allow the defendant to pursue any
resentencing remedy in the district court.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the court of appeals' order dismissing defendant's untimely
appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robin W. Reese
Attorneys:

Linda M. Jones, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake
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Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Jackson.
PER CURIAM:
This case is before the court on this court's motion as well
as the State's motion for summary dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. See Utah R. App. P. 10. The summary dismissal
motion was based on an untimely notice of appeal. Appellant Cox
was convicted by a jury. The Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment
issued December 8, 2003. Cox filed a motion for a new trial on
December 5, 2003, prior to sentencing and issuance of the final
judgment. The trial court issued findings denying Cox's motion
for a new trial on March 11, 2004. Cox filed his notice of
appeal on April 8, 2004. Because the motion for a new trial was
filed prior to sentencing and issuance of the final judgment, the
motion was premature and, therefore, untimely. See Utah R. Crim.
P. 24(c). As a result, the motion did not toll the time for
filing the notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b); State v.
Putnik, 2002 UT 122,^5, 63 P.3d 91. The notice of appeal, filed
within thirty days of the order denying the motion for a new
trial, rather than thirty days from the final judgment, is
untimely. See State v. Todd, 20 04 UT App 26 6; State v. Putnik,
2002 UT at ^|5. When a notice of appeal is untimely filed, this
court lacks jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss the
action. See Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570
(Utah Ct. App. 198 9 ) .

direct appeal as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38.
Cox argues that a motion under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act would not be feasible for him because of his pro se status
and the lack of resources available to him at the prison. Cox
also argues that proceeding under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act would not be a speedy remedy. However, the trial court has
the authority to appoint counsel on a pro bono basis for purposes
of a post conviction petition if the petition is not summarily
dismissed. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109 (2002). Moreover,
the fact that the process of litigating a post-conviction
petition takes time does not allow this court to assume
jurisdiction of an appeal not properly before it.
Accordingly, this appeal is summarily dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.

Russell W. Bench,
^ r e s i d i n g Judge
Assoc;

Norman H. Jackson Jiidgi"

ADDENDUM B
Constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules

Utah Constitution, art. V I I I
Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court]
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to
issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the
complete determination of any cause.

Sec. 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court—Judges pro tempore—Regulation
of practice of law]
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the
state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members
of both houses of the Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any
judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law,
including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
practice law.

U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2-2
§ 78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a
court of the United States.

(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to
issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or
in aid of its jurisdiction.

(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by
the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or
this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah
Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or
capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or
capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative
subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record
involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;

(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those
cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).

(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2a-3
§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs
and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas,
and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or
charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge
to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation,
adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court
may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter
over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.

(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

Utah Rules App.Proc.
RULE 2. SUSPENSION OF RULES
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, on its own motion or for
extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), 48,
52, and 59, suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case and
may order proceedings in that case in accordance with its direction.

RULE 4. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN
( a ) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from.

( b ) Motions post j u d g m e n t or order- If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under
Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the
judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion.
Similarly, if a timely motion is filed in the trial court (1) for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure,; or (2) to withdraw a plea under Utah Code Ann § 77-13-6, the
time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying the motion to withdraw the plea. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed
within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of
the motion as provided above.

( c j H i m g prior t o e n t r y of j u d g m e n t or order. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this
rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before
the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and
on the day thereof.

( d ) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party
may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal was
filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last
expires.

( e ) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good
cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days
after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties

in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion,
whichever occurs later.

( f ) Appeal by an I n m a t e Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution
files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely filed if it is
deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing
may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit
and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner
provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in paragraph (d) runs from the date
when the trial court receives the first notice of appeal.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE ()1 UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ROBERT ELLIS COX,
Defendant/Appellant.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO TEMPORARILY REMAND THIS CASE TO THE TRIAL
COURT FOR RESENTENCING; AND
IN OPPOSITION TO THE SUA
SPONTE MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION, AND TO THE
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Case No. 20040300-CA

This Memorandum is in response to the Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition and the State's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Also, it is in support of
Appellant Robert Cox's motion for resentencing. Cox requests that this Court temporarily remand this case for resentencing so that he may file a timely notice of appeal.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In lower court proceedings, the state charged Cox by Information with nine sexual
offenses against a child. A jury convicted Cox as charged, and on December 8, 2003, the
trial court imposed a combination of consecutive and concuirent sentences and entered
judgment against Cox. On December 5, 2003, prior to sentencing and judgment, counsel
for Cox filed a motion for a new trial. The state opposed the motion and on March 11,
2004, the trial court entered findings of facts, conclusions of law, and an order denying

the motion. On April 8, 2004, Cox filed a notice of appeal.
This Court maintains it lacks jurisdiction over the appeal where the new trial
motion "was premature and untimely" and did not "toll the time for filing a notice of
appeal." (Sua Sponte Motion, May 12, 2004.) The state asserts the same. (State's Motion
to Dismiss, April 30, 2004.) The state has asked this Court to dismiss the appeal, fid.)
Yet, a remedy exists for Cox. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(b) (2002);
the unpublished decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hassan . Case No.
20020885-SC; State v. Clark. Case No. 20010819-SC; and State v. Munford . 20010413SC;1 and Rule 60,Utah R. Civ. P., this Court may temporarily remand this case to the trial
court with directions to resentence Cox in order that he may properly perfect the appeal.
ARGUMENT
THE CONSTITUTION ENTITLES A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT TO A
DIRECT APPEAL. WHERE COX'S RIGHT TO APPEAL WAS COMPROMISED THROUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN, COX IS ENTITLED TO THE
PROCEDURAL REMEDY OF RESENTENCING IN THE LOWER COURT .
The Utah Constitution provides that M[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have . . . the right to appeal in all cases.11 Utah Const, art. I, § 12. In State v. Tuttle, 713
P.2d 703 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the right of appeal is essential
to a fair proceeding. "Rights guaranteed by our state constitution are to be carefully
protected by the courts. We will not permit them to be lightly forfeited." Id. at 704;

1

The unpublished decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in Hassan , Case No.
20020885-SC, Clark. Case No. 20010819-SC, and Munford. 20010413-SC, are attached
hereto as Addenda A, B, and C, respectively. See Utah R. App. 30(f) (2004).
2

see Manning v. State. 2004 UT App 87, ^9,496 Utah Adv. Rep. 26. If defendant has
been denied the right to appeal, Utah law recognizes that "in certain limited circumstances a defendant should be resentenced in order to revive [that] right." Manning, 2004
UT App 87, ^[10. Cox's circumstances support resentencing, as further ^:i !l>rtb /:\-:•::
A. In Manning this Court Reiterated the Procedural Remedy of Resentencing .
In Manning, 2004 UT App 87, this Court considered the procedures available to a
criminal defendant who has failed to perfect an appeal within the time limits set forth in
the rules Fhere, Manning entered a guilty plea 1= > "one coi nit of i mlawfi ll dealing wit! I
property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony; one count of failing to file a proper tax
return, a third degree felony; and one count of theft, a third degree felony." Id_ at ^[2. In
connection with the plea, Manning "acknowledged that by entering a guilty plea she was
waiving certain rights, including her right to appeal the coi lvictioi i " Id at "p.
"On September 27, 2001, Manning was sentenced." Id_ at ^[5.
On November 23, 2001, Manning filed a pro se notice of appeal, which this court
later dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In an unpublished decision, this court
explained that when a notice of appeal is filed beyond the 30-day appeal deadline,
see Utah R. App. P. 4(a), we lack appellate jurisdiction, and Manning's only
remedy if she was deprived of the right to appeal was to seek postconviction relief
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id, at TJ6. Manning returned to the lower court and filed a petition pursuant to Rules
65B(b) and 65C, Utah R. Civ. P., requesting "to be sentenced nunc pro tunc" in order to
"extend[] tl le time in <
" vhich to file a notice of appeal." Id. at %1. The trial court denied
the petition. IdL In the recently published opinion, this Court affirmed It n lied tl lat
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Manning would not be entitled to be resentenced. This Court stated, "If a defendant
knows of her right to appeal but voluntarily chooses to forego it, a change of heart after
the 30-day period for filing an appeal does not entitle her to be resentenced." IcL at ^[24.
This Court then elaborated on when a criminal defendant may be entitled to resentencing, and when the defendant may be allowed a remedy under Rule 65C of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA").
Specifically, in Manning, this Court recognized that "in circumstances where the
right to appeal has been denied, the trial court may resentence a criminal defendant nunc
pro tunc to provide the defendant with an opportunity to file a timely appeal." IcL at ^[9
(citing Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981)). According to the Court,
Both [the state and Manning] agree that if a defendant who wishes to appeal is
denied that right — by an attorney who fails to file a notice of appeal or, say, a
prison official who refuses to mail to an attorney a defendant's instructions to file
an appeal—the defendant should be resentenced to resurrect the right to appeal.
Id. at TJ24. Also, the state admitted that if a defendant affirmatively seeks to exercise the
right to appeal, and the right has been denied as a result of the inaction of counsel, or due
to an interference in the criminal justice system, the defendant should be resentenced. IcL
Yet, "resentencing" does not require compliance with Rule 65C and the PCRA.
To explain, the PCRA "establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all
other legal remedies, including a direct appeal." Manning, 2004 UT App 187, \\ 5 (cite
omitted). The substantive legal remedies under the PCRA include "post-conviction relief

4

to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1)
(2002). In addition, the PCRA "does not apply" to "petitions that do not challenge a
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense." Utah Code Ann ' 78-35a-102(2)(a). '
Resentencing is not a substantive remedy. It is procedural. A defendant who seeks
resentencing to perfect a direct appeal is not seeking to "vacate or modify the conviction
or sentence" (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-102(2)(a), -104(1)) at that juncture. Resentencing contemplates reimposition of a sentence already imposed so as to afford a defendant
the opportunity of "perfecting an appeal, since the time for taking such appeal would date
from the rendition of the new judgment." State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981).
It is an efficient, limited remedy. The door of resentencing does not swing open in the
trial court for a substantive challenge on the conviction or sentence. See State v. Hallett
856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993) (once a court determines that defendant was denied an
appeal, a direct appeal is immediately provided without deciding other claims).
In addition, where a person has been denied his right to appeal, he may not be
allowed the substantive remedies available under the PCRA , I d Ii idee -d, before a person
may be allowed such remedies, he must "exhaust[] all other legal remedies, including a
direct appeal." Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-102(l), -106, 108(1) (2002).2 Where a
person has been "denied" a direct appeal due to an occurrence that is not his fault, s_ee_

2

According to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(l), the PCRA establishes a substantive
remedy in cases involving criminal offenses "except as provided in Subsection (2).M
Under Subsection (2), the chapter does not apply to petitions that "do not challenge a
conviction or sentence in a criminal matter." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(2)(a).
5

Manning, 2004 UT App 87,ffl}24-25,that person has not yet exhausted his direct appeal.
Thus, his remedy is immediate resentencing. Hallett 856 P.2d at 1062.
B. A Defendant May Be Resentenced in the Trial Court Under This Court's
Authority Pursuant to § 78-2a-3(l)(b) or Rule 60(b).
When a defendant's right to appeal is compromised due to the malfeasance/deficiency of counsel, defendant is entitled to a procedural remedy in order to protect the
right to appeal. Specifically, this Court may temporarily remand the case for resentencing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(b), or Rule 60(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P.
Section 78-2a-3(l)(b) gives this Court jurisdiction to issue any process necessary
"in aid of its jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(b) (2002). The Utah Supreme
Court has invoked a similar provision to ensure that the right to appeal as guaranteed by
the Utah constitution is adequately protected. See. KL at § 78-2-2(2).
In State v. Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC, defendant filed a premature new trial
motion, resulting in an untimely notice of appeal. To remedy the untimely filing, the
Utah Supreme Court relied on its authority under § 78-2-2(2) to remand the case to the
trial court for resentencing in order that the defendant may properly perfect his appeal.
See Addendum A, hereto; Clark. Case No. 20010819-SC, Addendum B; Munford,
20010413-SC, Addendum C. This Court may do the same.
This Court has ruled that its authority to enter orders in aid of its jurisdiction is
equal to the authority of the Utah Supreme Court. In Barnard v. Murphy. 882 P.2d 679
(Utah App. 1994) ("Barnard II"), an attorney filed a writ with this Court against a trial
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judge, who failed to comply with the recusal procedures in Morris v. Morris. a divorce
case, among others. The writ was prompted by the fact that this Court had ordered the
judge in a previous matter to comply with the procedures. See id at 681. The trial judge
waited until shortly before oral argument in Barnard II to comply with tl le procedures ii 1
Morris. Id. No appeal was pending in Morris. Notwithstanding, this Court relied on its
authority under § 78-2a-3(l)(a), (b) to address recusal. Id. at 681-82.
This Court reasoned that where Utah law has provided this Court with subject
matter jurisdiction over Morris v. Morris, "we have authority to issue necessary writs iii
connection with that case even if no appeal is pending." Barnard II. 882 P.2d at 681;
see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)(a) and (2). This Court stated the following:
[T]his court's more generally phrased writ jurisdiction is apparently as broad as
the "original" writ jurisdiction bestowed upon the Supreme Court. In crafting the
jurisdictional language for the Court of Appeals, it is possible the Legislature
chose more general terminology to ensure this court's ability to issue extraordinary
writs in any case within the scope of our jurisdiction, whether the case fell within
our original appellate jurisdiction or was transferred to us by the Supreme Court.
Barnard II. 882 P.2d at 682.
Barnard II is relevant here. Where the Utah Supreme Court has applied its
companion provision (§ 78-2-2(2)) to order resentencing in cases where, for example, the
new trial motion was premature, see Addendum A, this Court may do the same. Barnard
II, 82 P.2d at 682 (recognizing that even for cases transferred from the supreme court,
this Court may invoke its jurisdictional powers under § 78-2a-3(l)). Thus, Cox requests
that this Court invoke its authority to issue any process in aid of its jurisdiction under §
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78-2a-3(l)(b), and temporarily remand this case with directions to resentence Cox.
In the alternative, this Court may temporarily remand this case for resentencing
under the civil rules. See Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a), 81(e) (2004). Specifically, pursuant to
Rule 60(b), a party may request relief from a final judgment for any reason "justifying
relief and "upon such terms as are just." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (2004).3
In this case, where Cox may be denied his right to appeal due to trial counsel's
failure to file a timely notice (see infra, subpart C , herein), Rule 60(b)(6) operates to provide limited relief from the judgment. See. Stewart v. Sullivan, 506 P.2d 74, 75-76 (Utah
1973) (stating that Rule 60(b)(7) - now 60(b)(6) - is sufficiently broad to permit the
court to set aside an order where counsel was incompetent and the opposing party was
not unduly prejudiced); State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 and n. 3 (Utah App. 1994)
(applying the provision of Rule 60(b) that "most benefits" the party seeking relief). That
is, due to trial counsel's malfeasance, Cox may be relieved from judgment, then resentenced nunc pro tunc so that he may perfect a proper appeal. Such terms would be just
and ensure Cox's right to appeal. See. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); Utah Const, art. I, §12.
C. Unless the Court Remands for Resentencing Cox Will Be Denied his Appeal

3

In the federal courts, Rule 60(b) is a successor to the writ of coram nobis. See U.S.
v. Torres, 282 F.3d 1241, 1245 n.6 (10th Cir. 2002). Also, federal courts have retained
their authority to issue common law writs in criminal proceedings. SeeEielonu v. INS,
355 F.3d 539, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2004). A motion for writ of coram nobis "is a step in the
criminal case and not" a separate civil proceeding. U.S. v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.
4 (1954); see Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (recognizing that coram nobis could be used to
vacate judgment in a criminal case and to resentence a defendant to open the door to an
appeal when the facts show that counsel's conduct deprived the defendant of the appeal).
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In this case, private counsel represented Cox in proceedings below. After the trial
and before sentencing, counsel filed a motion for a new trial. (See Trial Court Docket,
attached as Addend' .

:

- notion for a new trial was iiiitliiidy. See Utah

R. Crim. P. 24(c) (2004) (motion must be filed within 10 days after sentencing).
At sentencing, counsel for Cox referenced the appeal, and stated that since the
new trial motion was filed, "the necessity of filing an appeal is stayed pending the
resolution of that [motion]." (See. Sentencing Transcript, attached as Addendum E, at 5;
also Motion for a New Trial Transcript, attached as Addendum F, at 15-i /.; :- i • * . . s
understanding of the matter was erroneous. See State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, ^[5, 63
P.3d 91; State v. Vessev. 957 P.2d 1239 (Utah App. 1998). The untimely motion did not
stay the time for filing a notice of appeal. Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (2004).
In order to ensure a timely appeal, counsel for Cox should have either re-filed the
motion for a new trial within 10 days after sentencing, or filed a notice of appeal within
30 days of the judgment. See Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c); Utah R. App. P. 4. Counsel here
filed neither. (See Adder iciui i i D 1 lereto, at 11-15.) Where the record supports that Cox
intended to appeal from the convictions in this matter and counsel failed to file a timelj
notice of appeal, counsel's performance was deficient, and/or constituted malfeasance.
See Manning, 2004 UT App 87, ^f23 (recognizing that in cases where defendant intended
to appeal aiid trial counsel failed to file a timely notice, defendant was denied appellate
rights due to the malfeasance); Stewart, 506 P.2d at 75-76 (attorney's incompetence
justifies relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)); State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah
9

1996) (deficient performance and prejudice constitute ineffective assistance).
In addition, the trial court did not notify Cox at sentencing that he had 30 days to
file an appeal. (See Addendum E); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c) (2004) (following the
imposition of sentence, the court shall advise defendant of the time for filing an appeal).
Cox was prejudiced by the lack of notice and the deficient performance: If a
notice of appeal is not timely filed, this Court must dismiss the appeal. See Johnson, 635
P.2d at 37 (out-of-time appeals must be dismissed); Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320,
1322 (Utah 1982) (dismissing appeal relating to untimely notice for lack of jurisdiction).
In this case, Cox intended to exercise his constitutional right to appeal. (See
Addendum F, at 15-17.) He did not waive that right. See_ Manning, 2004 UT App 87,
^J 24-25. If this Court dismisses the appeal for jurisdictional reasons, Cox will be denied
a fundamental right. To obviate the prejudice that may result from the deficient performance, Cox requests that this Court invoke its authority under § 78-2a-3(l)(b), and temporarily remand this case with directions to the trial court to resentence Cox so that he
may perfect a proper appeal. See Manning, 2004 UT App 87,ffl[24-25;Hassan, Case No.
20020885-SC; Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; Munford, 20010413-SC. In the alternative, Cox requests that this Court temporarily remand this case for such relief and resentencing under Rule 60(b)(6). See. Stewart, 506 P.2d at 75-76. Supra, subparts A & B.
CONCLUSION
As set forth herein, Cox respectfully requests that this Court temporarily remand
this case with directions to resentence in order that Cox may perfect a proper appeal.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Carolyn Roberts MANNING, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20010911-CA.
April 11, 2002.
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1989). This court does
not have the authority to, along with a dismissal,
remand with instructions to resentence Appellant
nunc pro tunc, as Appellant requests. Appellant's
remedy, if she has been deprived of a constitutional
right of appeal, is to seek post-conviction relief
under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38
(Utah 1981).
For the reasons stated above, this appeal is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
RUSSELL W. BENCH, GREGORY K. ORME,
and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., JJ., concur.

Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake
City, for appellee.

2002 WL 538092 (Utah App.), 2002 UT App 114

Before BENCH, ORME, and THORNE, JJ.

END OF DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM.
*1 This case is before the court on its own motion
for summary disposition for lack of jurisdiction due
to an untimely notice of appeal. Appellant pleaded
guilty to unlawful dealing by a fiduciary and theft,
both second degree felonies. She was sentenced on
September 27, 2001, and the judgment was entered
the same day. Appellant filed a pro se notice of
appeal on November 23, 2001, beyond the statutory
thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal. See
Utah R.App. P. 4(a).
Because the notice of appeal was filed untimely,
this court is deprived of jurisdiction. When a matter
is outside the court's jurisdiction, it retains only the
authority to dismiss the action. See Serrato v. Utah
Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, 1 7, 13 P .3d
616; State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah
Ct.App.1989); Varian-Eimac v. Lamoreaux, 767
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